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NOTES
Inconsistent Taxation of Grantor Powers
"Certainty," Lord Hardwicke declared in 1753, "is the mother of
repose and therefore the law aims at certainty."' This note will ex-
plore the extent to which the law has missed the mark of certainty
2
in the taxation of trust grantors.
The heavy burden of federal income and estate taxation has
prompted many persons to divest themselves of property during their
lives. The property is usually given to a relative in order to shift the
income3 from the property into a donee's lower tax bracket and to
avoid the payment of an estate tax on the property by incurring an
inter vivos gift tax4 which is normally less than the estate tax would
have been.5 Many of these donative transfers of wealth are ac-
complished by the use of inter vivos trusts.6 The irrevocable inter
vivos trust7 is the most common vehicle employed by trust grantors
seeking the above objectives.
1. Gelhorn, The Law's Response to the Demand for Both Stability and Change:
The Legislative and Administrative Response, 17 VAND. L. REV. 91 n.1 (1963).
2. See FEDERAL ESTATE AND Gnrt TAXES-A PROPOSAL FOR INTEGRATION AND COR-
rELATION vrr TH-= INcomE TAx 2 (1947) [hereinafter cited as TREASURY STUDY].
This is a joint study prepared by an advisory committee to the Treasury Department
and by the Office of the Tax Legislative Counsel, with the cooperation of the
Director of the Division of Tax Research and the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
3. Unless the income is used to satisfy a legal obligation of support owed by the
grantor. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 677 [hereinafter cited as CODE] and text
accompanying notes 20-26 infra. For an interesting discussion of the possible inclusion
of a college education in the support obligation of a parent, see Note, 18 VAND. L.
REv. 1400 (1965).
4. If the grantor can be kept alive for the three years necessary to prevent the
Commissioner from contending that the transfer in trust was in contemplation of
death. See CODE § 2035. This statement presumes that a completed gift will not be
included in the estate of the grantor; however, the remainder of this note will deal
with many situations where a transfer complete for income and gift tax purposes is,
or may be, incomplete for estate tax purposes.
5. This tax saving is caused by the large differential between the gift tax and the
estate tax rates. See Westfall, Trust Grantors and Section 674: Adventures in Income
Tax Avoidance, 60 COLum. L. REv. 326 (1960). The unfairness of this situation
to persons who cannot afford to give away their property during life is manifest.
Even for the well-to-do salaried person there are problems in securing income producing
property to place into a trust.
6. Modern wealth consists primarily of personal property; the donative distribution of
this wealth is handled to a great extent by the age-old equity device-the trust.
ScoTrs, TRUSTS § 1.7 (1960). Most trusts consist of income producing securities. Id.
§ 1.7, at 18.
7. An irrevocable inter vivos trust, as the term is used in this article, is a trust
established during the life of the grantor which is not expressly subject to revocation
by either the grantor alone or in conjunction with anyone else or by anyone else.
Revocable trusts are not created for tax purposes since they neither relieve the grantor
of income taxes nor remove the property from his estate. Also, the grantor will not
retain any reversionary interests. Although a trust that could only be revoked by
the grantor in conjunction with an adverse party within the meaning of § 672(a) of the
Code would relieve the grantor of income taxes, such trusts are not effective for the
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Normally the grantor of a trust will want to retain some control
over the disposition and management of the trust property. It has
become increasingly apparent that the grantor's retention of certain
powers, although insufficient to cause the income to be taxed to the
grantor, may prevent the transfer from being complete for other tax
purposes or vice-versa. This article will attempt to point out and
analyze some of the more common tax inconsistencies facing the
grantor who retains various dispositive, administrative, or contingent
powers.
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
It has been urged that such trusts are merely the product of a
"nationwide adventure in tax avoidance."8 This note, however, will
proceed on the assumption that some types of trusts subject to retained
powers in the grantor are proper elements in sensible family property
planning. 9
One can readily understand the reasons for the grantor's retention
of any powers when he places the property in trust for the benefit of
others. First, the uncertainty of future economic conditions and future
needs of the trust beneficiaries makes it impossible and impractical to
include in the trust instrument explicit directions for the resolution
of every future contingency. Second, if discretionary powers con-
cerning the use of the property in trust are necessary, then it is only
normal for the grantor to want to control the exercise of such powers.10
Yet by incorporating this natural desire into the trust, the grantor
runs two substantial risks: The unexpected inclusion of property in
the grantor's estate may seriously upset the estate plan of a decedent
since such property is usually unavailable to bear the additional tax
burden. Also, if the grantor is unexpectedly liable for the income
taxes due on the trust income, then he must meet this income tax
saving of estate taxes. See CoDE § 2038. Normally a grantor who plans with an eye
toward the estate tax as well as the income tax will eschew any reversionary interests
or revocatory powers whether vested or contingent. Hereinafter, whenever a trust
is mentioned it is intended to refer only to an irrevocable inter vivos trust unless
otherwise indicated.
8. Westfall, supra note 5.
9. Holland, Kennedy, Surrey, & Warren, A Proposed Revision of the Federal Income
Tax Treatment of Trusts and Estates-American Law Institute Draft, 53 CoLUm. L.
REv. 316, 359 (1953). A leading authority on trusts recognizes that tax planning in
the use of trusts is not unwarranted. Scorr, op. cit. supra note 6, § 168.
10. The old adage "you can't take it with you" is indicative of this desire to hold
on to property as long as you can. If, as often is the case, the property placed in
trust consists of stocks in a family business, then the grantor obviously feels that he
is the best one to determine how the stocks will be used. Also, the grantor usually
feels best qualified to determine the financial needs of the beneficiaries. Some grantors
are afraid that if they do not retain some control over the property then the beneficiaries
will abandon them.
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liability with other after tax dollars. The risk of these burdens might
be sufficient to deter many grantors from establishing any trusts with
retained powers. Unless Congress intended to discourage all such
trusts, which seems unlikely since they are explicitly recognized by the
Code in Subchapter J, the inconsistencies in present tax law should
be uncovered, analyzed, and avoided if possible.
Although this article will discuss the possible tax consequences of
various retained powers it must be remembered that a power need
not be held by a grantor in order to cause adverse tax consequences
to him. For example, a power to control beneficial enjoyment held
by a non-adverse party will cause the grantor to be taxed on the
trust income." Equally important, however, is the fact that many
powers sufficient to provoke adverse tax treatment of a grantor if
held by the grantor are not attributed to him if held according to the
rules of the various taxes by others.1
2
This discussion will center on the tax consequences of certain
powers which are attributable to the grantor leaving the question to
be answered elsewhere of when a power, held by another, is attributed
to the grantor.
Before discussing the tax treatment of particular retained powers, a
familiarity with the basic rules for taxing trust grantors under the
federal income, gift, and estate taxes is necessary. Section 674(a)
of the Code provides that for income tax purposes:
The grantor shall be treated as the owner of any portion of a trust [created
as a gift] in respect of which the beneficial enjoyment of the corpus or the
income therefrom is subject to a power of disposition, exercisable by the
grantor .... 13
The remainder of section 674 sets out detailed provisions for certain
powers which, although logically contained within section 674(a),
do not cause the grantor to be taxed on the trust income.' 4 The gift
tax rules applicable to trust grantors are almost as explicit as the
income tax rules; however, the gift tax provisions are contained
primarily in the Treasury Regulations interpreting section 2511 of
11. CoDE § 674(a).
12. For example, a power to control beneficial enjoyment when held by a trust
beneficiary will not cause adverse tax treatment to the grantor. See CODE §§ 674(a),
2436(a), 2038(a).
13. CoDE § 674(a).
14. The current statutory scheme for the income taxation of trust grantors seems to
indicate that property owners should be allowed a large degree of flexibility in choosing
the kinds of interests they may create by transfers in trust, without loss of the income
tax benefits otherwise obtainable by immediate, absolute gifts. Westfall, supra note
5, at 332. See also Nance, Taxation of Trust Income to Grantors and Others as
Substantial Owners of the Property, 33 TAxEs 899, 904 (1955).
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the Code. These rules appear to correlate with the income tax pro-
visions of section 674.15
The major estate tax rules applicable to retained powers are
contained in sections 2036 and 2038 of the Code. Under section 2036
if the grantor retains either "the possession or enjoyment of, or the
right to the income from, the property... ."1 transferred by gift into
the trust or "the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person,
to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or
the income therefrom," 17 then the entire property subject to such
power will be included in the gross estate of the grantor. Section 2038,
applicable to powers affecting the corpus of the trust rather than the
income produced therefrom, provides in part that
The value of all property ... [transferred by the decedent for less than
adequate consideration], where the enjoyment thereof was subject at the
date of his death to any change through the exercise of a power ...to
alter, amend, revoke, or terminate. .. 18
shall be included in the estate of the grantor. The majority of the
inconsistencies are between the treatment of retained powers under
the income and gift tax laws and their treatment under the estate tax.Y'
Trust powers are generally classified as either dispositive or ad-
ministrative. Dispositive powers are expressly intended to affect the
beneficial enjoyment of trust property; whereas, administrative powers
are intended to facilitate the management of the trust in furtherance
of the trust objectives. Accordingly, the discussion will first consider
dispositive powers and then turn to administrative powers, concluding
with a comment on contingent powers which may be either one of
the other types of powers that are only exerciseable upon the happen-
ing of a particular event. It will further attempt to determine
whether observable or potential inconsistencies are the product of
the differing functions of the various taxes. If no policy or functional
reasons can be found for these inconsistencies, then the law's quest
for certainty and simplicity should be given effect by eliminating
them.
20
15. The correlation of the gift tax with the income tax rather than with the estate
tax would appear to be incongruous since the Supreme Court has stated that "the
purpose of the gift tax is to complement the estate tax... :' Harris v. Commissioner,
340 U.S. 106, 107 (1950).
16. CoDE § 2036(a)(1).
17. CODE § 2036(a) (2).
18. CODE § 2038 (a) (1).
19. "Many of the powers that, by virtue of § 674(b), may be held by the grantor
without income tax liability are sufficient to generate liability for estate tax." Birra.,
FEDmAL EsTATE AN Grvr TAXATION 974 n.2 (1958).
20. "While the differing functions of the income and estate tax levies, to tax the
substance of present enjoyment of income on the one hand and to tax testamentary
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II. DisposrrivE PowERs
A. A Power To Use Trust Income for the Support of
a Legal Dependent of the Grantor
A grantor can retain a power to apply trust income for the support
of a legal dependent who is a beneficiary of the trust without being
taxed on the trust income except to the extent that such income is
actually applied to the support of the dependent beneficiary.2' The
grantor can achieve this favorable income tax treatment only if he
holds the power as a trustee.22 Property transferred to a trust subject
to this power qualifies as a completed gift for gift tax purposes;2
3
however, there seems little doubt that the trust property would also
be included in the estate of the grantor under section 2036 of the
Code.24 Sections 2038 and 2041 would also cause estate tax inclusion;
however, section 2036 would include a larger portion of the property.
Obviously this is an inconsistency. The mere existence of this dis-
cretionary power to use trust income to discharge a legal obligation
of the grantor has no adverse income tax consequences and is con-
sidered insufficient to prevent the transfer of corpus from being a
completed gift for gift tax purposes. The estate tax law views this
situation differently since a right to have income applied to discharge
a legal obligation is equivalent to a reservation of the right to the
income.
Apparently, Congress wanted to allow trust grantors to make sure
that their transfers in trust would not render them incapable of meet-
and other death related transfers on the other, will preclude complete correlation,
the general objective of using, so far as possible, the same set of rules on retained
powers is certainly desirable." Pedrick, Grantor Powers and Estate Taxation: The
Ties that Bind, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 527, 562 (1959).
21. CODE §§ 674(b) (1), 677.
22. CODE § 677(b); see Pedrick, Familial Obligations and Federal Taxation: A
Modest Suggestion, 51 Nw. U.L. REV. 53, 59 n.17 (1956).
23. See Treas. Regs. § 25.2511-2(b) (1958) [hereafter the citations to the estate
and gift tax regulations will be for the year of 1958 unless otherwise indicated].
24. Since income of the trust used to satisfy the grantor's 'support obligation would
be the equivalent of having the grantor receive the money the trust property might be
taxed under § 2036(a)(1). Regardless of the applicability of § 2036(a)(1) to a
grantors discretionary power to apply trust income to a dependent beneficiary, §
2036(a)(2) would include any property subject to such a power since the power
can affect the beneficiaries who will receive the income. According to the literal
language of § 2036 it would make no difference under the estate tax rules if the
grantor had released this power prior to his death and not in contemplation of death.
To include property in the estate of a grantor when the grantor has relinquished his
connections and control over the property prior to his death would appear to be
an inappropriate use of § 2036. See Lowndes, Some Doubts About the Use of Trusts
To Avoid Estate Tax, 47 MINN. L. Rv. 31, 34-35 (1962). In this article the author
contends that contingent powers should not cause estate tax inclusion. Surely if a
power contingent at death is not includable for estate tax purposes, then a power
not existent at death should not cause inclusion.
19031965 ] NOTES
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ing their support obligations.2- If such a power were not allowable
under the income tax laws, then grantors who suffered financial re-
verses might find themselves faced with trusts which did not allow a
diversion of the trust income to meet their support obligations. Since
a transfer of trust income in satisfaction of a support obligation will
not affect the corpus of the trust, there is no reason not to treat the
transfer of corpus as a completed gift for gift tax purposes. In con-
sidering the estate tax consequences of this power it appears relatively
clear that the inclusion of the trust corpus in the estate of the grantor
is necessary to prevent evasion of the estate tax. If a person retains a
right to use property or its income for his own benefit until he dies,
then for all practical purposes he has made only a testamentary gift
of the property regardless of when the technical legal interest in the
property became vested. The American Law Institute proposal for
the income, estate, and gift taxation of trust grantors recognizes the
necessity for this inconsistent treatment in order to prevent evasion
of the higher rates of the estate tax when this is clearly the type of
transaction intended to be covered by the estate tax. Thus, this
aspect of the current statutory treatment of trust grantor retaining
this power was incorporated into the proposed revision.2 Although
inclusion of the entire property subject to this power may be ad-
ministratively convenient, it is suggested that an evaluation procedure
would be fairer and more appropriate if it is desirable to encourage
grantors to retain such a power. Under the income tax only trust
income actually applied to the support obligation is taxed to the
grantor. There does not seem to be any reason why the estate tax
could not be geared so as to include only part of the trust property.
Arguably if, as a trustee, a grantor's power so to apply trust income
were subject to an ascertainable standard, then section 2036 would
25. The reader must remember that if the existence of a discretionary power causes
a grantor to be taxed on the trust income subject to such a power, then this may
be quite a hardship on the grantor since be is not receiving any of the trust income.
Thus, he must take other funds, after tax dollars, to meet this additional tax. Obviously,
most grantors cannot afford to retain a power which will cause them to incur adverse
income tax consequences. See Holland, Kennedy, Surrey & Warren, supra note 9, at
359.
26. See AMERICAN LAW INSTrTUTE, FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE, AND GIFT TAX
STATUTE, § X2012, commentary at 198-99 (Tent. Draft 10, 1955) [hereinafter cited
ALI, Tent. Draft No. 10].
Under the Treasury Study a transfer in trust subject to a power in the grantor to
apply the trust income to the support of a legal dependent would not render the
transfer incomplete for purposes of the integrated transfer tax; however, there would
not be less tax due since under the integrated scheme all transfers are taxed on a
cumulative basis with testamentary transfers being merely the last to be made under
the same overall ascending rate. See TREAsURY STUDy 25. The income tax treatment of
such a trust under the Treasury proposal would be the same as under the CODE. See
TREASURY STUDY 33.
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not cause the trust property to be included in the grantor's estate. 7
This argument is based on the assumption, called the Jennings doc-
trine, that so long as the standard is observed, the grantor lacks any
discretionary power to shift enjoyment from one beneficiary to
another, and that a fear of suit for breach of trust prevents the
grantor-trustee from deviating from this standard. Both of these
assumptions are probably unrealistic. Numerous cases, however, have
held that a power exercisable by a grantor as trustee subject to a
definite standard does not cause the trust property to be included in
the grantor's estate.28 There seems to be a strong possibility that a
power to apply trust income for the benefit of a legal dependent of
the grantor, which power is only exercisable in accordance with a
definite standard, will not cause the corpus of the trust to be included
in the grantor's estate.2 9 It is submitted, however, that this power
should no more be allowed under an estate tax which is intended
to include property subject to a grantor's control than it would be
allowed under the income tax rules in the absence of specific congres-
sional authorization. Yet, as suggested earlier, it may be possible to
bring the estate tax treatment of a trust subject to this power in line
with the income tax treatment. If the estate tax inclusion were
geared to the extent of the power to apply income in satisfaction
of the grantor's legal obligation of support so that only a realistic
portion of the property would be included in the estate, then there
would exist some degree of symmetry between the taxes.
B. A Power To Accumulate Income
Often a grantor wishes to provide that trust income may be ac-
cumulated rather than distributed to the income beneficiaries. If this
power to accumulate is attributable to the grantor, then the income
tax provisions require, in order for the grantor to avoid being taxed
on the income, that any income so accumulated be distributed ulti-
mately to the current income beneficiary, or his estate, since he
would have received the income but for the exercise of the power
27. See, e.g., Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947); Estate of Wier, 17 T.C.
409 (1951); Estate of Wilson, 13 T.C. 869 (1949). See generally Pedrick, The Artful
Tax Dodger Faces Life and Looks at Death, 28 TAxEs 1151 (1950).
28. See note 27 supra. It could be contended that CODE § 2041(b) (1) (A) indicates
a congressional recognition of the validity of the Jennings doctrine. The existence of
CODE § 2041(b) (1) (A) may, however, indicate an intent to reject the applicability of
the Jennings doctrine to retained powers which are taxed under §§ 2036 & 2038 since
Congress could have explicitly incorporated the doctrine as it did for mere donated
powers in § 2041 (b) (1) (A).
29. ALI, Tent. Draft No. 10, commentary at 196. A grantor should not be greedy
in listing the various contingencies since a court might view the situation as a retention
of substantial control by the grantor if every possible contingency imaginable will allow
the grantor to affect the beneficial enjoyment of the trust.
NOTES 1905
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to accumulate.30 Basically then, this power allows the enjoyment
of the trust income to be postponed but not shifted except to the
extent that the accumulated income will go to the estate of a
current beneficiary who dies during a period of accumulation. The
existence of this power will not prevent the transfer of the corpus
in trust from being considered a completed gift.31
The Supreme Court in Lober v. United States32 indicated that for
estate tax purposes a power to determine when the trust income will
be enjoyed gives the grantor a right to designate the persons who
shall enjoy the income. The adverse treatment of this power appears
to be the result of an overly technical application of section 2036(a)
(2), although it has been contended that the existence of such a power
in the grantor allows the actual enjoyment of the rights of the
income beneficiaries to be postponed for the life of the grantor,33
thereby making the trust arrangement testamentary in nature. "Such
a power of accumulation, however, is very limited in scope since its
operation as a method of adjusting beneficial enjoyment depends upon
the untimely death of the current income beneficiary."' The preced-
ing opinion of an advisory committee to the Treasury has been
adopted by the American Law Institute;5 consequently, both pro-
posals allow a grantor to retain an accumulation power as described
by the present income law without causing estate tax inclusion. More-
over, since the right of accumulation affects only the income produced
by the trust and Congress has indicated its approval of the power for
income tax purposes it is submitted that the Lober decision should not
be applied so as to include in the estate of the grantor the corpus of
a trust subject to this power.
30. CODE § 674(b) (6) (A) & (B). These subsections contain some special varia-
tions, but their main thrust is to assure that the grantor's power of accumulation will
be used only to postpone, rather than shift, the receipt of trust benefits.
31. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(d).
32. 346 U.S. 355 (1953). In this case, the grantor created trusts of which le was
trustee. The beneficiaries were his children who, upon reaching 21, would receive
any of the trust income accumulated by the grantor. The trust principal was
to be distributed to the children or their heirs when the children reached or would
have reached 25; however, the grantor retained a power to advance the principal to
the children before they reached 25. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the
grantor's power as trustee, to either advance the principal to the children prior to their
25th birthday or require them to wait was sufficient cause for the principal to be
included in his gross estate under the rationale of § 2038.
33. See Pedrick, supra note 20, at 547.
34. TnxAsuny STUDY 21.
35. ALl, Tent. Draft No. 10, 191. This proposal purports to adopt the rule that
any transfer wherein the actual enjoyment of the corpus or income therefrom is or
may be geared to the life of the grantor will be included in the grantor's estate;
however, an exception is made for the situation when the only possible shifting of
interests will be between the existing beneficiaries and their estates due to the
grantor postponing the enjoyment of the trust property involved. See Pedrick, sispra
note 20, at 547 and accompanying footnotes for a criticism of this exception.
1906 [ VOL. 18
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In order to be safe a grantor may desire to make the exercise of
this power of accumulation subject to a standard containing sufficient
contingencies designed to effectuate the grantor's intent. Accordingly,
the Jennings doctrine would prevent such a power from causing
estate tax inclusion; however, this highlights a further inconsistency
in the taxes since a standard is not necessary for favorable treatment
under the income or gift tax law.
This situation provoked a leading commentator to observe that:
The estate tax is more stringent under the impact of the Lober decision with
respect to powers to accelerate and postpone distributions of corpus and
income, but more liberal than the income tax on the matter of actually
switching beneficial interests in income and corpus under the Jennings
doctrine. 36
It is this writer's opinion that the Lober rationale constitutes a serious
estate tax trap which should not exist when the income accumulation
powers retained by the grantor are authorized by the income tax
rules.
C. Powers To Invade Corpus
1. Power To Distribute Corpus to Current Income Beneficiary-
Chargeable Against Beneficiary's Share of Corpus.-A discretionary
power in a grantor-trustee to distribute the principal to a current
income beneficiary is a neutral power for income tax purposes if the
principal advanced must be charged against the proportionate share
of the corpus held for that beneficiary, even though this power is
subject to no standard.37 Under the rationale of the Lober case the
grantor would incur an estate tax on the corpus subject to such a
power,38 although for gift tax purposes the transfer of corpus would
be complete.39 It is difficult to see how a transfer to trust with the
corpus subject to an unlimited invasionary power can be considered
a completed gift unless the income beneficiaries are also the remain-
dermen.40 Of course, if the invasionary power cannot benefit the
grantor, then from his point of view he has made a completed gift.
36. Id. at 552.
37. CODE § 674(b) (5)(B).
38. Arguably, since a power to invade corpus cannot adversely affect the income
interests, it is logical to assume that the estate tax would not include the full value of
the property transferred, but would rather be limited to the value of the remainder
interest. See Estate of Du Charme v. Commissioner, 164 F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 19471.
However, since an invasionary power over corpus can increase the amount presently
received by the income beneficiaries, it has been contended that the language of the
Supreme Court in Estate of Holmes v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 480 (1946), and in
Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953), indicates that the full value of the
property is includable in the grantors gross estate. ALI, Tent. Draft No. 10, 191-92.
39. Id. at 192.
40. Id. at 182, 192.
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Since the donees and/or their respective amounts are not presently
ascertainable, however, it can be argued that no gift has been com-
pleted.
Regardless of the actual gift tax result there remain several estate
tax problems. If the income beneficiaries also have the remainder
interests, then an invasionary power is merely a way to accelerate
enjoyment of the trust property. Clearly, if the remainder interests
are not vested in the income beneficiaries, an invasionary power
should cause at least the value of the remainder interest to be in-
cluded in the grantor's estate.41 The estate tax answers are not nearly
so clear when the income beneficiaries are also the remaindermen. A
transfer which made it absolutely certain that the remainder interests
could not be obtained until the death of the grantor would not cause
the trust property to be included in the grantor's estate. It would
appear anamolous to hold that a power in the grantor to cause the
property to pass prior to his death is sufficient to include the property
subject to the power in his estate. The present law, however, does
just this by virtue of section 2037 which allows the grantor to make
his death the significant point in the passage of the trust property
provided that he does not retain a five per cent reversionary interest.
42
The American Law Institute proposal would apparently allow a
grantor to retain an unlimited invasionary power when the income
beneficiaries or their estates are also the remaindermen, provided
that invasions must be charged against appropriate corpus shares.
43
This is a more liberal approach than that taken by the Treasury
study which would allow only a limited power of invasion, although
even this obviously permits some continuation of control over the
corpus.44 Since a limited power probably means a power subject to
a standard the Treasury proposal would appear to be the same as
existing law.45 Thus, unless saved by the Jennings standard, any
retained discretion to accelerate the distribution of corpus to a current
41. Id. at 213 ex. (k).
42. It has been urged that any trust interests the enjoyment of which is only
ascertainable with reference to the death of the grantor should be included in the
estate of the grantor. See Pedrick, supra note 20, at 535 n.31. However, this is not
the case under the present estate tax law. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2037-1(e).
43. See ALI, Tent. Draft No. 10 § X2012(a) (3) (B), commentary at 182. See
also Pedrick, supra note 20, at 547, for a discussion of the allowance of a corpus inva-
sionary power when the income and corpus beneficiaries are the same and the inva-
sionary power is only exercisable in favor of the income beneficiaries.
44. TREAsURy STuDY 21.
45. See Jennings v. Smith, supra note 27. But see TREASURY STuDY 177, App. B ex.
20, where it is indicated that an invasionary power subject to a standard might be
incomplete. Although this observation may have preceded the Jennings case since
they were both handed down in 1947, it is indicative of another possible inconsistency
between the income and estate taxes.
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income beneficiary who would ultimately take the corpus will cause
inclusion of the corpus in the grantor's estate.46 The dangers of estate
tax avoidance created by this power, which is explicitly allowed under
the present income tax laws,47 do not appear substantial enough to
warrant this inconsistency in tax consequences.
The income tax only requires that corpus advancements to income
beneficiaries be chargeable against their proportionate shares of the
corpus. 48 This will prevent a grantor from eliminating the income
interest of one income beneficiary by advancing all of the corpus to
another income beneficiary. This is a fine safeguard to prevent the
grantor from shifting income interests. In cases where the remainder-
men are not the income beneficiaries, however, a power to advance
corpus to the income beneficiaries without any limiting standard
allows the grantor during his life to retain a power to determine who
will get the corpus. Accordingly, such a power should cause estate
tax inclusion under existing rules. Possibly, the grantor should be
deemed the substantial owner for income tax purposes; 49 however,
Congress has specifically authorized this power. Until the income
tax rule is changed inconsistent treatment of this invasionary power
is inevitable.
2. Power To Distribute Corpus Limited by a Reasonably Definite
Standard.-Section 674(b) (5) (A) presents another problem. This
section allows a grantor to retain a power to distribute corpus to
any income or corpus beneficiary without incurring any income tax
liability on the trust income, provided that the power is limited by
a reasonably definite standard which is set forth in the trust instru-
ment. Supposedly this power is not inconsistent with the policies of
the income tax since it applies only to corpus, i.e., the income interests
are fixed and unalterable by the grantor.50 However, there is a fallacy
in this supposition since if all or, in fact, any of the corpus is dis-
tributed, this will affect the amount of income produced by the trust.
To this extent a grantor does retain a power to shift the income
interest within the confines of the reasonably definite standard.5 1 This
may be an indirect adoption of the Jennings doctrine under the income
tax rules. Of course, it can be said that the presence of the standard
46. Pedrick, supra note 20, at 536.
47. CODE § 674(b)(5)(B).
48. Ibid.
49. This would appear unlikely if the power were geared exactly to the provisions
of CoDE § 674(b) (5) (B).
50. See Alexandre, A Summary of the Treasurys Study on Integration and Correla-
tion, 25 TAXms 955, 957 (1947).
51. For examples of various standards see Pedrick, supra note 20, at 536 n.33. See
also Fleming, Best Interests as a Standard for Trustee Action, 46 ILL. B.J. 764 (1958).
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prevents the grantor from exercising any real personal control. Rather,
the grantor is the mere ministerial agent of the trust instrument. This
makes better reading than sense. As a practical matter the grantor
has considerable discretion in applying a supposedly definite stand-
ard.52 Also, who will challenge his action? Not the trust beneficiaries;
they usually have fond inheritance hopes. Possibly a trustee, par-
ticularly a commercial trustee, might challenge a grantor's decision
since a distribution of all of the corpus will stop his trust fees. Most
commercial trustees, however, have visions of executorship and desire
to retain a community reputation for harmonious relationships with
trust grantors. Apparently, the retention of this power is not as
compatible as previously supposed with the income tax policy of
taxing grantors on the trust income which they substantially control.
Under the gift tax law the existence of this power would not render
the transfer of corpus to the trust an incomplete gift.53 Apparently,
the estate tax rules would recognize the supposed innocuousness
of a reasonably definite power to invade corpus.m It can be argued,
however, that, in addition to the Alice in Wonderland attributes of
a standard, the income tax rules themselves indicate that grantor
powers over corpus should cause estate tax inclusion. The income
tax rules do not allow a grantor to retain a power to distribute income
among various beneficiaries, even if the power is limited by a standard.
Accordingly, why should it be presumed that Congress intended to
allow such a power over corpus under the provisions making powers
over corpus a basis for estate tax inclusion? If Congress had intended
to allow retained powers over corpus subject to a standard under
section 2038 of the Code, then it could have easily incorporated the
rationale of section 2041(b). Although, at present an invasionary
power limited by a reasonably definite standard is allowable under
the estate tax, the future is uncertain. The American Law Institute
proposal recognizes that, although such a power can be allowed under
the income tax rules, the reservation of such a power "effectively
postpones the transferee's possession or enjoyment of the transferred
property until the death of the transferor. . . ."55 It is submitted
52. For an indication that the power to invade corpus for certain contingencies is
largely within the trustee's discretion, see Westfall, supra note 5, at 341.
53. The Treasury Regulations under the gift tax require that the grantor hold the
power as a trustee whereas the grantor may hold the power in any capacity under the
income tax laws. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(c).
54. See Pedrick, supra note 20, at 536.
55. ALI, Tent. Draft No. 10, 182. But see TREASURY STUDY, where such a power
is allowable without adverse tax consequences on the basis "that transferors should not
be entirely precluded from attempting to meet the needs of changing circum-
stances .. " Id. at 21. Although the Treasury's proposal is usually stricter on the
powers which a grantor can retain, this exception is understandable due to the inte-
grated transfer tax. It makes no difference whether the transfer is taxed during life
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that the retention of a power to invade corpus subject to a standard
should cause inclusion of the corpus by the estate tax rules as long
as there is a difference between the tax rate applied to inter vivos
and testamentary transfers.
III. ADImISTRATVE PowERs
A. Power To Allocate Receipts and Disbursements
Although the power to determine whether receipts and disburse-
ments should be allocated to the income or corpus interests of a
trust is normally considered administrative,56 the income tax provision
allowing a grantor to retain this power5 7 is not included in the section
expressly applicable to administrative powers.m Undoubtedly, this
power will enable the grantor to exercise some control over the income
and corpus interests. In addition to the general trust law applicable to
this power,59 most states have statutes which provide for this allocation
process; however, these rules are often very unsatisfactory due to
vagueness or other uncertainties. 0 Even a severe critic of the current
statutory scheme approves the inclusion of this power in the trust
instrument as necessary to allow the trust to operate smoothly and
with certainty.61
The gift tax laws appear to recognize the necessity for this power,
but the gift tax regulations do not mention it expressly.6 2  There
appears to be some basis for an inference that the transfer will not
be deemed a completed gift if the power to allocate receipts and
disbursements is exercisable by the grantor in a non-fiduciary capacity
without regard to a fixed standard.6 It is reasonable to require that
a grantor hold this power as a trustee because the allocation is
normally considered to be part of trust administration. Also, the
primary justification for the power is the assistance which it gives
trustees. Nevertheless, by requiring that the power to allocate be
subject to a fixed standard, the Treasury Regulations create some
uncertainties. Do the normal trust laws provide a sufficient standard?
or at death as far as the rates are concerned. So actually the rationale of the
Treasury's position is a substantiation of the present income tax treatment, but is not
really applicable to the gift and estate tax rules as long as there is a rate differential.
56. See ScoTt, op. cit. supra note 6, § 233.
57. CODE § 674(b) (8).
58. CODE § 675.
59. REsTATEMiENT (SEcoND), TRusTs § 174 (1959).
60. Dunham, A Trustee's Dilemma as to Principal and Income, 26 U. Cm. L. REv.
405 (1959).
61. Westfall, Trust Grantors and Section 674: Adventures in Income Tax Avoidance,
60 COLUxm. L. REv. 326, 336 (1960).
62. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2.
63. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(g).
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Probably not; but it would seem a little impractical to spell out in
the trust instrument how the trustee will make the necessary alloca-
tions. Furthermore, if a trust instrument standard is required for
gift tax purposes, then trusts created within the framework of the
income tax laws will not be considered completed gifts. Since the
Treasury has succeeded in having many completed gifts included
in the estate of the grantor it is not unlikely that the Treasury would
successfully argue that transfers in trust which are not completed
gifts should be included in the estate of the grantor.
The Lober decision makes it possible that a power of allocation
will cause estate tax inclusion regardless of its gift tax consequences.
Since a power to allocate will necessarily affect the corpus interest,
section 2038 might require inclusion. Although the Commissioner
might argue that section 2036 is applicable, it does not seem likely
that a power to allocate, by itself, could be construed as a right to
designate the persons who shall enjoy the income merely because the
income interests would normally be affected slightly.
This entire discussion of the possible estate tax consequences of
a power to allocate would be very tenuous except for the case of
State Street Trust Co. v. United States.64 This case involved several
administrative powers held by the grantor as trustee, including the
power to allocate receipts and disbursements.65 Although the court
in State Street emphasized that the cumulative effect of the various
administrative powers retained by the grantor as trustee was to allow
the grantor to determine what persons would possess or enjoy the
property or the income therefrom, it is important to note that a
literal application of State Street along the line of the Clifford rationale
would require estate tax inclusion of untold numbers of trusts wherein
the trustee had a power to allocate and this power was attributable
to the grantor.6 6 Accordingly, it is submitted that in most situations
the possible inconsistent estate and income tax consequences of a
power to allocate has no justifiable basis in logic or function.
B. Power To Invest
Most of the property transferred in trust consists of stocks or other
securities. In such instance, a power in the trustee to change the
trust property by buying and selling is generally considered indis-
pensable in providing for efficient and economical administration of
the trust and furtherance of the trust objectives.
6 7
64. 263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959).
65. See Kamanski & Spears, Recent Development in the Taxation of Trusts, U. So.
CALIF. 12TH INST. ON FED. TAx 567, 582 n.34 (1960).
66. ALI, Tent. Draft No. 10, at 177-79; TREASURY STY 38.
67. Brrcam, AxoFRD & EFFLAND, DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS 319 (2d ed.
1961). In order to effectuate the trust objectives, the trust property must be of a nature
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The income tax rules allow a grantor to retain a power over the
investment of trust property if exercisable only as a fiduciary or with
the consent of a fiduciary. 68 Apparently, a power over investment
would not affect the gift taxation of a transfer in trust subject to
such a power.69
It has been generally assumed that the estate tax treatment of an
investment power was coordinated with the income tax; particularly
since there are no estate tax provisions explicitly applicable to either
an investment power or the broader category of administrative powers.
Consequently, an investment power in the grantor could cause estate
tax inclusion only under the sections dealing with powers either to
alter or amend the beneficial enjoyment of corpus or to designate the
persons to enjoy the income.70 For a very long time it was thought
that these sections did not reach powers of administration, such as a
power to invest.
7'
Obviously, an investment in growth securities rather than high
yield securities or vice-versa could affect the beneficial enjoyment of
either the income beneficiaries or the remaindermen.72 Realizing this,
the court in State Street, when faced with an investment power not
limited by the standards normally applied under state law,7 3 refused
to consider it as an innocuous power. Although, as mentioned earlier
in the discussion of a power to allocate, it is difficult to determine
exactly what weight the court gave to each of the administrative
powers involved in the State Street case, it would appear probable
that an investment power as broadly framed as that in State Street
would be sufficient to incur estate tax inclusion under section 2038.
Estate tax inclusion would seem to be inconsistent with the express
authorization of an investment power exercisable by a fiduciary under
the income tax rules.74 It has been suggested that this inconsistency
is illusory since the rationale of the State Street case would apparently
have allowed the grantor to be taxed on the income of the trust
during his lifetime.75 This suggestion, however, has not been judicially
substantiated.
which is equal to and harmonious with these objectives.
68. CODE § 675(4)(B).
69. See Tomlinson, Advantages and Dangers of Trustee Powers, N.Y.U. 20"r INsT.
ON FED. TAX 195, 204 n.34 (1962) and accompanying text.
70. CODE §§ 2036, 2038.
71. Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929). See generally MEmuRTis,
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION §§ 25.08, .39 (1959); NossAmAN, TRUST
ADNMUSTRATION AND TAXATION § 38.11 (1958). But see Commissioner v. Hager's
Estate, 173 F.2d 613 (3d Cir. 1949), a case foreshadowing State Street Trust.
72. The remainder interests could be wiped out by investing the trust assets in a
rapidly wasting asset.
73. See Tomlinson, supra note 69, at 199.
74. CODE § 675(4)(B).
75. Kamanski & Spears, supra note 65, at 587.
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Apparently, then a grantor-trustee who retains an investment power
runs a risk of estate tax inclusion. Although the risk would appear
to be slight in most cases, it does exist to plague the careful planner.
Accordingly, it is suggested that the risk can be obviated by making
the power of investment subject to an ascertainable standard. This
standard could be inclusive enough to give the grantor the desired
flexibility without creating any real risk of estate tax inclusion since
the inclusion of an investment power not subject to any standard is
a tenuous matter.7 6 The necessity of an ascertainable standard to
prevent estate tax inclusion would introduce a further inconsistency
between the requirements of the income and gift tax rules and the
estate tax rules since no standard is required under the applicable
income and gift tax provision.77
It should also be noted that the income tax restrictions on the
investment powers of a grantor are applicable only when the trust
securities are of corporations in which "the holdings of the grantor
and the trust are significant from the viewpoint of voting control."78
The rationale of State Street would seem to apply to any investment
powers. Although neither the American Law Institute's proposal nor
the Treasury Study explicitly list an investment power as one of the
indicia for estate tax inclusion, both would include in a decedent's
estate any property upon which he was liable for income taxes at
the time of his death.79
It is submitted that the income tax approach to the situation where
a settler retains an investment power achieves a correct balance be-
tween economic realities and the desires of the grantor. When a
grantor retains an investment control over what is, in effect, his
closely held corporation, it is appropriate to require that this power be
exercised as a fiduciary; otherwise, there has not been a significant
relinquishment of the grantor's control. When, however, the trust
property does not consist of stocks in his closely held corporation,
there is less incentive or desire for an investment power to be used
to perpetuate the grantor's control for his own benefit. Often the
grantor will have great acumen in making investments which he will
want to use for the benefit of the trust. The estate tax should not
be applied so as to prevent the grantor from making his investment
expertise available to the trust; otherwise, either the creation of
trusts will be discouraged or the trust property will not be able to
76. Brrrmm, FEDERAL INcowm, ESTATE AND Gwr TA.-rroN 974 n.1 (2d ed. 1958).
77. CODE § 675(4) (B); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2.
78. CODE § 675(4) (B). The regulations do not indicate exactly what is meant by
the term "significant from the viewpoint of voting control."
79. ALI, Tent. Draft. No. 10, § 2012, commentary at 177-79; TREAsURy STUDY 17.
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flow freely in response to the economic demands of our free enter-
prise system.
There appears to be no real reason why a grantor should object to
having the exercise of any investment power subject to a fiduciary
standard or to the consent of a fiduciary. Accordingly, it is suggested
that all investment powers retained by a grantor be exercisable only
as a fiduciary or with the consent of a fiduciary. Investment powers
not meeting this standard should cause income and estate tax inclu-
sion. This approach would insure consistency between the taxes and
prevent the troublesome question under the income tax rules of when
an investment power may be exercisable by a grantor without being
subject to a fiduciary standard or the consent of a fiduciary. Also,
the business acumen of the grantor will be available to insure the
proper mobility of the trust property.
C. Power To Vote Trust Securities
Obviously, if the securities transferred in trust are in a family
corporation which the grantor has built up during his life, then the
grantor will have a strong desire to retain control over the manage-
ment of this corporation. Probably the grantor will consider himself
the only person qualified to determine how the business is run. In
this situation the income tax rules require that the grantor exercise
any retained voting power as a fiduciary or with the consent of a
fiduciary,80 if the securities are in a corporation in which the holdings
of the grantor and the trust are significant from the viewpoint of
voting control. The rationale of State Street would apparently cause
stocks subject to the grantor's voting control to be included in his
estate since the grantor would be able to affect the declaration of
dividends of the corporation and other aspects of its activities which,
in turn, could affect the interests of the trust beneficiaries. The extent
to which the grantor could actually affect the interests of the
beneficiaries would appear to be very limited except in those cases
explicitly dealt with under the income tax rules, i.e., where the hold-
ings of the trust and the grantor were significant. Thus, where the
securities comprising the corpus of the trust do not either by them-
selves or in conjunction with other securities subject to the grantor's
control constitute a significant voting interest in the corporation,
there does not appear to be a basis for estate tax inclusion.
The recognition by the income tax rules that a retained power to
vote securities which constitute a significant interest in a corporation
will allow the grantor to exercise significant control over the trust
property appears applicable under the estate tax rules of section
80. CODE § 675(4) (A).
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2038. Although many commentators deprecate the effectiveness of
a fiduciary standard in limiting the actions of a grantor, it is sug-
gested that any voting powers which pass muster under the income
tax rules should not cause inclusion under the estate tax. Moreover
it is suggested that, as with investment powers, it would be better
if the exercise of all voting powers were subject to a fiduciary standard.
IV. CONTINGENT POWERS
Contingent powers are not really a separate category of powers
which a grantor may retain over a transfer in trust since either a
dispositive or an administrative power may be contingent. Also,
contingent powers closely resemble powers subject to an ascertainable
standard since a contingent power arises only upon the happening
of a particular event.
Normally, contingent powers, unless they fall prey to section 67381
dealing with reversionary interests, will not cause the grantor to be
taxed on the trust income.8 2 Nor will they cause estate tax inclusion
under section 2038 if not vested at the time of the grantor's death.
3
The Treasury has contended, however, that contingent powers can
cause estate tax inclusion under section 2036 (a) (2).84 For example, if
the grantor has a contingent power to appoint himself trustee, then
the Treasury would consider this sufficient reason to attribute all of
the trustee's powers to the grantor.85 By attributing the trustee powers
to the grantor the Treasury would render the trust property in-
cludible in his estate in many situations. Presently there has been
no judicial recognition of the Treasury's position on contingent
powers.
8 6
It has been suggested that a recent revenue ruling bodes trouble
for contingent grantor powers.87 Under this ruling, a transfer in trust
will not be considered a completed gift as long as the actual beneficial
receipt by the donee remains subject to a power in an independent
trustee to alter or amend the trust. The rationale of the ruling appears
to be that the actual receipt by the donee is contingent upon the
non-exercise of the trustee's power. Obviously this will create estate
problems for the grantor of such a trust since if the transfer is not
a gift, then the Treasury will surely contend that the property should
81. CODE § 673.
82. Section 674(A) refers only to powers held by the grantor.
83. Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1(a) (3), (b).
84. Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b) (3); see Lowndes, Some Doubts About the Use of
Trusts To Avoid Estate Tax, 47 Mrn-z. L. REv. 31 (1962).
85. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b) (3).
86. See Lowndes, supra note 84, at 34-35.
87. Rev. Rul. 13, 1962-1 Cum. BULL. 181.
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be included in the grantor's estate.88
Apart, however, from the implications of trustee powers, the con-
tingency rationale of the revenue ruling may be applicable to contin-
gent grantor powers. If the happening of the contingency Would vest
the grantor with a power to alter the beneficial enjoyment of the
trust, then the transfer in trust may not be treated as a completed
gift since the receipt by the donee will be subject to the grantor's
control upon the happening of the particular contingency.
Since the existence of a vested power in a trustee which renders
contingent the receipt of the remainder interests has not resulted in
estate tax inclusion for the grantor, it may be unnecessary to worry
about estate tax inclusion due to a contingent grantor power which,
if vested, would make the actual receipt by the beneficiaries contin-
gent upon the non-exercise of the power. The Treasury Study would
apparently require income tax inclusion of property transferred sub-
ject to a contingent grantor power to revest the property in himself;89
however, it is not clear whether a contingent power not exercisable in
favor of the grantor would cause the same treatment.90 Presumably
there would be no difference. The estate tax problems of contingent
powers and reversionary interests are not particularly acute under an
integrated transfer tax since inter vivos gifts, are not treated more
favorably than testamentary gifts. The American Law Institute
proposal, 91 which is much nearer to the present system of taxation,
would not impose an income tax on a grantor who holds a con-
tingent power. Nor would the existence of such a power cause estate
tax inclusion unless the contingency were such that it made the
grantor's death a significant event in the devolution of the property.92
It is suggested that no adverse tax consequences should flow from
the existence of a power as long as it remains contingent except for
estate tax purposes when the contingency is geared to the life of the
grantor. Accordingly, unless the law changes rapidly in this area
there does not appear to be any danger in the retention of contingent
powers which are not geared to the life of the grantor so as to make
the disposition appear to be testamentary. Even if the grantor's death
were significant in the passage of the trust property there would not
be, as pointed out earlier, any estate tax inclusion unless the grantor
retained at least a five per cent reversionary interest.
88. Otherwise, a grantor making such a transfer could escape any income, gift, or
estate taxation. See Lowndes, supra note 84, at 49.
89. TnF_,strm Snruny 32-33.
90. Ibid.
91. ALI, Tent. Draft No. 10, at 178.




The grantor must be careful in choosing the powers which he
retains over property placed in a non-reversionary trust. The income
tax rules are too liberal in their allowance of substantial dispositive
powers. This liberality is probably due to their origin. The present
income tax rules concerning the taxation of trust grantors were based
on the Treasury Regulations promulgated in response to the Clifford
case. Since the Clifford case involved a reversionary trust the regula-
tions were geared to recognize the interest of the grantor in the trust
corpus which was intended to return to him. Problems occur when the
concepts embodied in these regulations are applied to trusts in which
the grantor has no reversionary interest. The courts have often held,
as noted earlier, that many of the grantor powers authorized by the
income tax rules are inappropriate under the estate tax rules governing
non-reversionary trusts. It is not unreasonable to assume that many
grantors of non-reversionary trusts have been induced to retain sub-
stantial dispositive powers due to their explicit authorization in the
income tax provisions. It is suggested that the income tax provisions
should be amended to deal separately with reversionary and non-
reversionary trusts. The income tax rules concerning non-reversionary
trusts would then establish a narrower scope for retained grantor
powers. A narrowing of the income tax rules would do much to
promote consistency in the tax treatment accorded the grantors of
non-reversionary trusts.
The estate tax treatment of administrative powers is probably out
of line with the realities of life. Many grantors feel a strong desire
and responsibility to continue the management of their wealth for
the greater benefit of their loved ones. The few instances where a
grantor misuses administrative powers should not cause all grantors
to forego the administrative powers due to a fear of estate tax
inclusion. If all administrative powers are held as a fiduciary, then
the fiduciary obligations enforceable by equity should be sufficient to
handle the exceptional case.
Contingent powers are a curious breed. Obviously, if the contin-
gency is geared to the survivorship of a beneficiary or otherwise to
the life of the grantor, then estate tax inclusion appears to be
appropriate. A contingency unrelated to normal testamentary consid-
erations should not cause adverse tax consequences unless the power
vests prior to the death of the grantor.
Unless Congress accepts the very logical approach of the Treasury
Study which eliminates the distinction between inter vivos and testa-
mentary gifts and coordinates the substituted transfer tax with the
income tax, trust grantors will continue to run the gauntlet of incon-
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sistencies either through inadvertance or in quest of tax savings. A
possible reason why Congress has been reluctant to adopt the Treasury
Study is that the Study does remove a large part of the tax advantage
attendant to inter vivos giving. Without this tax advantage people
might hold on to their property until death, thereby removing enor-
mous amounts of wealth from the flow of commerce and promoting
the accumulation of wealth in a few hands. Obviously, society has
a strong interest in avoiding these results. Unfortunately Congress
has not been very interested in dealing positively with the problems
presented in this note. Hopefully some of the more dangerous spots
in the gauntlet of inconsistencies have been illuminated pending
congressional reform.
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